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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred upon the above-entitled Court by S 78-2a-
3(2)(f), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
(PRESERVATION OF APPEAL ON THE RECORD) 
This is an appeal from a conditional plea of guilty to said third degree felony to allow the 
Appellant to challenge the Court's denial of Appellant's Motion to Suppress. 
1. There was insufficient reasonable articulable suspicion to stop the Defendant's vehicle. 
Trooper Fox made his determination to stop the tractor-trailer under the misapprehension that he 
had the right to stop any tractor-trailer to check the driver's log book. Preserved for appeal at R. 
130, p. 7. After the Trooper turned on the Defendant's vehicle and while looking for a place to 
stop him, the Trooper observed that one brake light out of four was out on the trailer. Preserved 
for appeal at R. 130, p. 7. 
Conclusion of law in criminal cases are reviewed for correctness. State v. Thurman 846 P. 
2d 1256 (Utah 1993). State vs Brown. 852 P.2d 851 (Utah 1992). Supporting authorities are: 
State vs Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994) and Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 
1883, 20 L.Ed.2d (1968). 
2. The Utah Highway Patrol Trooper unlawfully detained the Defendant after his initial 
reasons for the stop had been concluded. The Trooper's stated reasons for that extended detention 
was that he had observed the driver was extremely nervous, and (2) was unresponsive, and had a 
physically defective right arm. The drivers inability to carry on a decent conversation; dry mouth 
and licking of his lips are all consistent with nervousness. Preserved for appeal at R. 38, pp. 42-
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47. 
Conclusion of law in criminal cases are reviewed for correctness. State vs. Thurman 846 
P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993). State v. Brown. 853 P.2d 851 (Utah 1992). Supporting authorities are: 
State v.Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994) and Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 
1883, 20 L.Ed.2d (1968). 
3. The State claims two grounds for searching the cab sleeper of the tractor, towit: (1) 
probable cause for the officer to believe that CNS stimulants would be in the vehicle (aka the 
automobile exception rule), and (2) to conduct an impound inventory. 
During the extended detention of Mr. Chevre, the Trooper concluded (based upon some 
tests) that Mr. Chevre was under the influence of a CNS stimulant, but failed to articulate his 
probable cause for believing that illegal CNS stimulant would be found in the tractor cab. 
Preserved for appeal at R. 38, pp. 48-52. 
The State failed to introduce the Utah Highway Patrol's impound inventory policies and 
therefore failed to establish that Trooper Fox followed such procedures when he searched the 
tractor cab. Preserved for appeal at R. 38, p. 53. 
Conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness. Thurman. supra. Supporting authorities 
are: State v. Schlosser. 774 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989), State v. Mendoza. 748 P.2d 181 and United 
States v. Henslev. 469 U.S. 221, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985). 
4. In the absence of well established department vehicle impound inventory policies and 
procedures authorizing its patrolmen to open sealed packages, it was a violation of the 
Defendant's rights under the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States 
Constitution and Article I, section 12 of the Constitution of Utah for Trooper Fox to open the 
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sealed package containing marijuana. Preserved for appeal at R. 38, pp. 53-54. 
Conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness. Thurman. supra. Supporting authorities 
are: State v. Schlossen 774 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989). State v. Mendoza. 748 nP.2d 181 and United 
States vsHenslev. 469 U.S. 221, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction of a third degree felony, Unlawful Possession of a 
Controlled Substance, More than One Pound of Marijuana. This conviction is based upon 
appellant's conditional plea of guilty to said charge to enable him to appeal the Trial Court's denial 
of his motion to suppress. (Addendum) 
At the suppression hearing, counsel for the parties stipulated that the transcript of the 
preliminary hearing should be made a part of the record and considered by the Court as evidence 
on the suppression issues. The Court accepted the stipulation. (R. 130, p. 11) 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTION PROVISIONS 
The controlling statutes and constitutional provisions are found in the Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 18,1995, Utah Highway Patrolman Stanley B. Fox pulled over a west bound tractor 
trailer on U.S. Highway 89 in Kanab, Utah. (R. 131, p. 75,11. 15-25) The tractor was being 
driven by the Defendant and the only other occupant was a male in the passenger seat. (R. 131, 
pp. 9-12 and p. 42,11. 17-20). The Trial Court made the following findings of fact regarding the 
Troopers grounds for making the stop. 
* * * 
4. Tooper Fox decided to pull over the tractor trailer to check 
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the driver's log book. 
5. As Trooper Fox was preparing to find a place to pull over the 
tractor trailer, he noticed an inoperable brake light on the trailer 
6. Trooper Fox made the stop primarily to check the driver's log book 
and conduct a mechanical inspection. (R. 103) 
The trailer had four brake lights, two on each side.(R. 130, p. 16)1 
Once the Trooper had made the stop, he talked to the driver (William Chevre) and noticed 
that Mr. Chevre was "pretty" nervous arid that his left arm seemed "kinda" unresponsive and there 
seemed to be a physical defect of some type.(R. 131, pp. 13-14) At about that time, the Trooper 
began to ask the Defendant questions relating to his log book and registration permits. (R. 131, pp. 
13-14) The Trooper then ask the Defendant out of the tractor to show him that the break light 
was out and a leaking oil seal. (R. 131, 14-15) The Trooper had observed Mr. Chevre's extreme 
nervous condition; his inability to carry on a decent conversation, his cotton or dry mouth and 
continual licking of his lips. (R. 131, p. 15,11.19-24) The Trooper then invited Mr. Chevre into the 
Trooper's truck. The Trooper's purpose in having Mr. Chevre get into the Trooper's truck was to 
"... kind of go over the log book and have more discussion. "(R. 131, pp. 15-16,11.15-1) 
Once the Trooper had Mr. Chevre in the Highway Patrol truck, Trooper Fox ask Mr. Chevre 
l
. Section 41-6-121.10, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) provides: "Every motor 
vehicle, trailer, semitrailer, and pole trailer shall be equipped with two or more stop lamps 
meeting the requirements of the department, provided the department may by rule allow one stop 
lamp on any vehicle equipped with only one when it was made." ( emphasis added)(R. 131, p.7, 
11.21-22) 
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to do some drug recognition tests (hereafter DRE) for the following reasons: inability to carry on 
a good conversation; cotton mouth, dry lips, his very nervous condition ("... his foot was-was 
virtually bouncing off the floor while he was seated in the vehicle.") and somewhat inconsistent 
answers on his where he had been. (R. 131, p. 17) 
The Trooper then ask Mr. Chevre to engage in some drug recognition tests. (R. 131, p. 18,11. 
19-22) The drug recognition tests were then performed. (R. 131, pp. 19,22-37) At the time, 
Trooper Fox had completed a drug recognition course, but did not hold a drug recognition 
evaluator's certificate because copies of the evaluations had not been sent in to the instructors and 
he had not sent in a resume. (R. 131, pp.21-22) Based on his training and the DRE evaluations, 
Trooper Fox determined that Mr. Chevre was under the influence of the central nervous system 
stimulant and placed him under arrest. (R. 131, p.37) The only violation the Trooper initially 
arrested the Defendant for was for driving under the influence (of drugs). (R. 131, pp. 38,11. 24-
3) Trooper Fox then opened and looked into the trailer. (R. 131, p. 89) Then he went to the 
cab of the tractor; entered, immediately opened the curtain to the closed off sleeper area (R. 131, 
p. 40,11. 12-19), lifted up some blankets, saw some bundles wrapped in plastic and tore the corner 
off of one bundle revealing a green leafy substance with the appearance of marijuana. (R. 131, 
pp. 40-42 13-14) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I: The Utah Highway Patrolman stopped the tractor trailer being operated by Mr. 
Chevre for two reasons as follows: (1) to check his log book, and (2) the trailer had a brake light 
out. Apparently Trooper Fox was operating under a misapprehension that he had statutory 
authority to stop any and all commercial vehicles to check their log books.. There were four brake 
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lights on the rear of the tailer and section 41-6-121.00, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, 
only requires two brake lights on the rear of a vehicle. Therefore, Trooper Fox had insufficient 
reasonable suspicion or grounds to make the stop. 
POINT II: The Trooper detained Mr. Chevre for further investigation after he had 
concluded his business regarding his stated reasons for the stop. After Trooper Fox had checked 
the log book and had shown Mr. Chevre the mechanical defects, he should have warned Mr. 
Chevre and sent him on his way. 
POINT III: The investigation, "drug recognition evaluation" (DRE), that took place 
thereafter was not justified by the Trooper's observations that Mr. Chevre had a physical defect 
and displayed characteristics of nervousness. Therefore, Mr. Chevre's arrest was not justified and 
the search of the tractor trailer cannot be supported on the theory of search incident to arrest. The 
inability of Trooper Fox to articulate why any of his observations provided him with any probable 
cause to believe that CNS stimulants would be found in the tractor, is grounds for the Court to 
suppress the evidence found in the tractor. Further, Trooper Fox should have obtained a search 
warrant since the tractor trailer was not going anywhere and other officers were there to secure 
the tractor and its contents. 
POINT IV: No Utah Highway Patrol impound inventory policies and procedures were 
received into evidence. Trooper Fox claims that he tore open one of the bundles he found under 
the covers in the sleeper compartment pursuant to an impound inventory. According to Bertine. 
infra, and Shamblin. infra, and since Trooper Fox did not follow department standardized 
procedures in doing so, the marijuana should be suppressed. Those case require that standardized 
policies and procedures be followed by law enforcement officers when they inventory the contents 
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of a vehicle pursuant to an impound. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
WAS THERE SUFFICIENT REASONABLE ARTICULABLE SUSPICION TO STOP AND 
EVEN IF THERE WAS, SHOULD THE TROOPER HAVE TERMINATED THE 
DEFENDANT'S DETENTION WHEN THE REASONS FOR THE STOP HAD BEEN 
DEALT WITH. 
In this case trooper Fox made his determination to stop the Defendant's vehicle under the 
misapprehension that he had the right to stop any tractor trailer to check its log book. After a 
thorough search of the Utah Code, this author has concluded that nowhere in Utah law is a police 
officer authorized to stop a commercial or any vehicle for the purpose of checking a truck driver's 
log book. This author believes that the prosecution will concede that point. 
After having made that erroneous decision and while following the tractor trailer looking for a 
place to pull it over, the Trooper noticed that a break light was out. Therefore, the question is as 
follows: Having determined to stop the vehicle on fallacious ground, is an after observed 
mechanical defect justification for an officer to stop the vehicle? After exhaustive research, this 
author has found no authority that is determinative. In State v. Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994), 
where the facts are similar to the instant case (but missing one fact), the Supreme Court held that 
an observed traffic violation (including a mechanical) defect is grounds for an officer to stop a 
vehicle. However, the missing fact is that the officer in (Lopez, supra), did not admit that he had 
formed the intent to stop before observing the mechanical problem. Therefore, the Defendant 
urges the Court to conclude that the Trooper would not have turned on the Defendant's vehicle 
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(commenced investigative procedures) had he not been mistaken as to the law and therefore, the 
stop was improper. 
This Memorandum will leave that question unresolved and turn to the next issue which may 
well render the previous question moot. That is: Did the Defendant' detention extend beyond the 
time needed to clear the situation leading to the stop? 
POINT II 
DID THE TROOPER UNLAWFULLY DETAIN THE DEFENDANT AFTER HIS INITIAL 
REASONS FOR THE STOP HAD BEEN CONCLUDED. 
Based upon the Trooper's sole remaining reason for the stop, towit: defective brake light, the 
encounter should have concluded with the Trooper issuing Mr. Chevre a citation or warning for 
defective equipment unless the Trooper could articulate observations arising prior thereto that 
gave rise to independent reasonable suspicion to pursue an investigation into the sleeping 
compartment of the tractor. The Trooper failed to so articulate. 
From the facts it would appear that the appropriate time for the Trooper to terminate the 
detention would have been right after he had the driver out of the tractor and had shown him the 
oil leak and the defective break light. 
The following is what had occurred prior to that point: the Trooper had made the stop; 
approached the cab, talked to the driver, observed that the driver was pretty nervous, that his left 
arm was unresponsive which the Trooper characterized as a physical defect, and had asked about 
the log book and registration permits. Also, by that time, the Trooper had probably observed 
what he characterized as the Defendant's "kind of...inability to carry on a decent conversation,"(R. 
131, p. 15), his dry mouth and the licking of his lips. It was at this point where the Trooper could 
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have and should have cited or warned Mr. Chevre for defective equipment. 
The drivers inability to carry on a decent conversation; dry mouth and licking of his lips 
are all consistent with nervousness. Neither nervousness nor a physically defective left arm give 
rise to reasonable articulable suspicion that Mr. Chevre was engaged in criminal conduct. That 
leaves extreme nervousness as the reason for the stop. 
In State v. Schlosser. 774 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989), the following facts were at hand: The 
officer observed the driver doing 42 mph in a 35 mph zone, while stopping the vehicle he 
observed the passenger of the pickup bending over, acting fidgety, turning left to right, and 
turning back to look at the officer. Also, when the stop was made, the driver met the officer 
between the two vehicles and the passenger continued to move about in the cab causing the 
officer to conclude that the passenger was trying to hide something. The officer then approached 
the passenger door; tapped on the window and immediately opened the door whereupon the 
officer saw marijuana and paraphernalia in the cab in plain view. In that case (Schlosser. supra), 
the Utah Supreme Court sustained the trial court's suppression of the evidence and in doing so 
wrote the following: 
* * * 
The state argues that the officer's opening the door constituted 
an extension of an "investigative detention" and that the officer's 
actions were lawful because defendants' activities gave rise to a 
reasonable suspicion either of criminal activities or of danger to 
the officer's personal safety. Therefore, the State asserts that 
the judge erroneously applied a probable cause standard instead 
of a reasonable and articulable suspicion standard in the hearing 
on the motion to suppress. As stated above, Officer Howard's 
action of opening the car door constituted a search, not an 
investigative detention, and therefore, the probable cause 
standard was correctly applied by the trial court. However, 
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even if the State's premise were accepted that no search 
occurred, the facts do not support a reasonable and 
articulable suspicion standard in the hearing on the 
motion to suppress. As stated above, Officer Howard's 
action of opening the car door constituted a search, not 
an investigative detention, and therefore, the probable 
cause standard was correctly applied by the trial court. 
However, even if the State's premise were accepted that 
no search occurred, the facts do not support a 
reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity 
which is necessary to support the State's position. See 
State v. Dorsey. (Citation omitted); State v. Carpena. 
(Citation omitted); State v Swanagan. (Citation 
omitted). 
An investigative detention is justified if a police officer 
has a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the automobile's 
occupants are "involved in criminal activity." United States v. 
Henslev. 469 U.S. 221, 226, 105 S.Ct. 675, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 
(1985); Dorsey. 731 P.2d at 1087, 1090. Additionally, an 
officer may search a vehicle for weapons if he has a reasonable 
belief that the suspect is dangerous and "may gain immediate 
control of weapons." Michigan v. Long. 463 U.S. 1032, 1049, 
103 S.Ct. 3469, 3481, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983). In such 
instances, "due weight must be given, not to [the officer's] 
inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch,' but to the 
specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from 
the facts in light of his experience." Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 
27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1883, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). 
Here, Officer Howard had no probable cause, and no 
articulable suspicion either that his safety was in danger or that 
the occupants were engaged in criminal activity. He cited no 
safety concerns as the basis for his actions; he sought only to 
investigate the possibility that defendants were engaged in 
illegal activity, and for that reason he opened the passenger 
door. Compare United States v. Pajari. 715 F.2d 1378, 1382 
(8th Cir. 1983) (driver's nervousness coupled with information 
from multiple informants and previous police observations 
provided reasonable, articulable suspicion for investigative 
stop) with Jones v. United States. 391 A.2d 1188, 1191 (D.C. 
1978) (furtive gestures by a passenger and location of vehicle 
and time of stop did not "rise to the level of articulable 
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suspicion"). 
Officer Howard's testimony does not support an 
articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Mere furtive gestures 
of an occupant of an automobile do not give rise to an 
articulable suspicion suggesting criminal activity. See People v. 
Superior Court of Yolo County, 3 Cal.3d at 821-24, 478 P.2d 
at 457-59, 91 Cal.Rptr. at 737-39 (passenger's actions of 
turning and putting her arm over the back of the seat, then 
facing forward, bending down towards floor, and then resuming 
normal position did not support probable cause to search); 
Spence v. State. 525 So.2d 442 (Fla.App. 1988) (leaning down 
as if putting something on floorboard did not justify officer's 
suspicion); People v. Mills. 115 111. App. 3d 809, 71 Ill.Dec. 
247, 450 N.E.2d 935 (1983) (defendant's fast movements and 
leaning forward as officer approached did not create reasonable 
suspicion). 
Schlosser's movements, turning to the left and to the 
right, appearing fidgety, bending forward, and turning to look at 
the officer, do not, without more, show a reasonable possibility 
that criminal conduct had occurred or was about to occur. 
Schlosser may have been attempting to locate a driver's license. 
He could have been preparing for conversation with the officer 
by turning down the volume on the radio or extinguishing a 
cigarette. He may also have been putting away food and 
beverages, changing a baby's diaper, putting on the parking 
brake or doing a host of other innocuous things. When 
confronted with a traffic stopr it is not uncommon for drivers 
and passengers alike to be nervous and excited and to turn to 
look at an approaching police officer. See State v. Mendoza. 
748 P.2d 181, 184 (Utah 1987). A search based on such 
common gestures and movements is a mere "hunch." not an 
articulable suspicion that satisfies the Fourth Amendment, 
(emphasis added.) 
A driver's leaving the vehicle to talk to the officer, as 
Lowder did, is also reasonable behavior and not indicative of 
criminal conduct. Pennsylvania v. Mimms. 434 U.S. at 110, 
states that a driver's exiting his vehicle to talk with a police 
officer may actually be safer for the officer than for him to talk 
to the driver who remains inside the vehicle. See also People v. 
Superior Court. 3 Cal. 3d at 826-27, 478 P.2d at 462, 91 Cal. 
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Rptr. at 742. Officer Howard did not point to anything 
which made Lowder's exiting the truck unusual or 
suspicious. Lowder had his driver's license and 
registration in hand, but that is neither unreasonable nor 
so suspicious as to give rise to an inference of illegal 
activity. 
In short, the trial court did not err in ruling that the facts 
do not support an articulable suspicion of criminal activity. [5] 
(emphasis added) 
Another way to analyze the "reasonable suspicion of criminal activity" issue is the ask the 
following question: At the point where the Trooper had shown Mr. Chevre the mechanical defect, 
what had the Trooper observed that would give rise to reasonable suspicion of what criminal 
activity? The answer is NONE. What criminal activity? NONE. Based on Trooper Fox's 
observation up to that point, no reasonable person and no reasonable police officer could have 
articulated in what criminal activity Mr. Chevre was suspected of being engaged. 
Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that the Trooper should have terminated his detention at 
that point by issuing Mr. Chevre a citation or warning for defective equipment. It also follows 
that the investigation (DRE) that took place thereafter was unjustified and that the Defendant's 
arrest as a result thereof was improper. 
POINT III 
WAS THE SEARCH JUSTIFIED BY THE "PROBABLE CAUSE"; "IMPOUND 
INVENTORY", OR "SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST" EXCEPTIONS TO THE SEARCH 
WARRANT REQUIREMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE U.S. 
CONSTITUTION. 
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The State claims two grounds for searching the cab sleeper of the tractor, towit: (1) 
probable cause for the officer to believe that CNS stimulants would be in the vehicle (aka the 
automobile exception rule), and (2) to conduct an impound inventory. (R. 131, p.40, 11.2) 
Implicit in Trooper Fox's testimony is the additional grounds of search incident to arrest. 
First follows an analysis of the Trooper's reasonable suspicion to believe that a CNS 
stimulant would be found in the cab or sleeper. 
After the DRE, Trooper Fox, arguendo, had reasons to believe that Mr. Chevre was under 
the influence of a central nervous system (CNS) stimulant he arrested the Defendant and searched 
the sleeper compartment of the cab. However, one must ask, whether that gives rise to a 
reasonable belief that CNS stimulants would be found in the vehicle. Based on Trooper Fox's 
observations of the Defendant, Trooper Fox formed a suspicion that Mr. Chevre was under the 
influence of a CNS stimulant, i.e., that Chevre had ingested a CNS stimulant. Nowhere does 
Trooper Fox articulate why that would make him think that such a stimulant would be found in 
the vehicle. Further, there is at least one legal CNS stimulant, towit: caffeine. (R. 131, pp. 84, 
11. 22-25 through 85, 11. 1-7) 
* * * 
..., even if the circumstances are such that the police are 
excused from the necessity of having a search warrant for an 
automobile, they are nonetheless authorized to conduct a search 
of a vehicle for evidence only if they possess probable cause that 
particular items of evidence are presently concealed therein, 
(emphasis added) 
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure. Second Edition 1987, section 5.2 (c). 
An example of where the Court found such sufficient probable cause is U.S. v. Jones. 452 
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F.2d 884 (8th Cir, 1971). In that case the Defendant was stopped after he made an illegal turn; 
ran a red light while driving a car without a plate and when the officer approached he saw the 
Defendant tear up a piece of paper and push the pieces between the seat and the cushion. When 
the officer retrieved the torn pieces of paper they turned out to be a stolen welfare check. In 
other words, the officer articulated probable cause to believe that the Defendant was hiding 
contraband. 
It has been well established since Chimel v. California. 395 US 752, (S.Ct. 1969) that 
because of the moveable nature of automobiles, under certain circumstances a search warrant may 
not be required. One of those circumstances is that the officers can articulate probable cause to 
believe that particular items of contraband may be located in the vehicle. Observations of the 
Trooper that, arguendo, caused him to reasonably believe that Mr. Chevre was under the 
influence of a CNS stimulant are not grounds for him to believe that he would find such a 
substance in Defendant's vehicle. To the contrary, such a finding by Trooper Fox would 
reasonably cause him to believe that Mr. Chevre had ingested a CNS stimulant. The absence of 
any attempt by Trooper Fox to articulate why any of his observations (prior to the search) 
provided him with probable cause to believe that CNS stimulants would be found in the tractor, 
should give the Court pause in concluding that he had probable cause to believe that illegal CNS 
stimulants might be found in the vehicle. 
However, probable cause is not the only requirement of the "automobile exception" rule. 
In State v. Christensen. 676 P.2d 408, (Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme Court clearly outlined 
the requirements of the "automobile exception" rule in Utah, as follows: 
* * * 
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... there is probable cause to search an automobile stopped on the 
highway; the car is movable, the occupants are alerted, and the car's 
contents may never be found again if a warrant must be obtained, 
(emphasis added) 
For this exception to apply, the police must have probable cause to 
believe that the automobile contains either contraband or evidence of a 
crime and that they may be lost if not immediately seized. ... (emphasis 
added) 
In the instant case the last requirement is missing. The tractor was not going anywhere. The 
driver and the passenger could be secured (R. 131, p. 42,11. 8-23); the trooper could have and 
should have secured the keys and the tractor. Also, a second officer was present (R. 131, p. 10, 
11. 10-15) and a third officer arrived before Trooper Fox left the scene of the stop. (R. 131, 100, 
11. 12-20) 
The United States Supreme Court defines probable cause as facts and circumstances 
within (the officers') knowledge sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution to 
believe that an offense has been or is being committed. See United States vs Cortez. 449 U.S. 411, 
417-418 (1981). The State bears the burden of establishing both probable cause and exigent 
circumstances in order for a warrantless search to fall within the automobile exception under Art. 
I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. See, State v. Larrocco. 794 P.2d 460, 470 (Utah 1990). 
In State vs Robinson. 797 P.2d 431 (Utah App. 1990), the court held that troopers did not 
have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity necessary to justify continued detention and 
questioning of defendants once a warning citation was given and purpose for initial stop had been 
accomplished. In Robinson, Defendants appealed their conviction of unlawful possession of a 
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controlled substance found while troopers were conducting a routine traffic stop. Officers stopped 
the vehicle for improper passing. The officers made a routine check on the driver's license and 
vehicle registration and found the vehicle was not registered to either of the occupants. The 
defendants explained that their boss at a floor covering business had allowed then to take the 
work van on a two week fishing trip to Wyoming. While checking out their story, the officers 
noted the nervousness of the occupants, and observed that a homemade bed, two feet high, filled 
the back of the vehicle. Based on what they observed the trooper determined to ask for consent to 
search the vehicle. Id., at 433. The Defendant, Robinson, consented and the troopers observed 
five marijuana seeds in the rear corner of the van. When the officers failed to get consent from 
Robinson to look under the bed, the officers stated that they would attempt to get a search 
warrant. Officer Ogden then asked Robinson, "Since you won't let us take the plywood panel off 
the van to look under the bed, would it be all right if we let a dog go through the vehicle?" 
Robinson replied, "yes" and asked if allowing the dog to sniflF meant giving consent to search. The 
Officer said "yes" and Robinson shook his head affirmatively. The defendants were later arrested 
when the dog gave a positive alert at the rear of the bed and trooper located eight duffel bags of 
marijuana in the space under the bed. Id., at 434. The court concluded the in light of the troopers' 
questioning and conduct, the coercive atmosphere at the time, and the other surrounding 
circumstances, the State had not borne its burden that consent to search the vehicle was 
voluntary. They reached the same conclusion about Robinson's subsequent consent to allow the 
narcotics dog to search the van interior. Id., at 438 
The issue raised by this Defendant is not a "consent" issue, however, the analysis used by 
the Robinson (supra) Court is applicable to the facts of this case. 
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Trooper Fox testified that the first thing he did after arresting Mr. Chevre was to open the 
trailer to look for evidence of CNS stimulants]. (R. 131, 89,11. 2-17) The next thing that 
Trooper Fox did was enter the cab of the Tractor, going immediately to the sleeper. Trooper Fox 
testified that the first thing that he did upon entering the cab was to open the curtains to the 
sleeper. (R. 131, p.40,11. 12-19). Trooper Fox never articulated why he thought drugs would be 
found in the cab of the tractor or in the sleeping compartment. 
POINT IV 
IN THE ABSENCE OF WELL ESTABLISHED IMPOUND INVENTORY POLICIES AND 
PROCEDURES AUTHORIZING THE OFFICER TO OPEN SEALED PACKAGES, IS IT A 
VIOLATION OF DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS FOR THE OFFICER TO 
OPEN THE SAME. 
Trooper Fox characterized his search of the cab of the tractor as being an impound inventory. 
(R 131, p.90,11. 5-14) It is a well founded constitutional principle that a police officer may not 
open sealed or closed containers during an impound inventory unless he is acting in accordance 
with standardized, specific department procedure mandating the opening of all such containers. 
See Colorado v. Bertine. 479 U.S. 367 (1987) and State v. Shamblin. 763 P.2d 425 (Utah App. 
1988). Pursuant to Trooper Fox's "impound inventory" of the sleeper compartment of the cab of 
the tractor, he tore open the corner of a bundle wrapped in plastic and observed marijuana therein. 
(R. 131, p. 41) Since this was a warrantless search, the burden is upon the state to establish that 
the Trooper followed such standardized and specific department procedures. (State v. Shamblin. 
supra). No such department written policies and procedures were received into evidence at the 
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preliminary hearing or the suppression hearing held in this case. There is nothing in the transcript 
that even suggests whether or not the Utah Highway Patrol's policies and procedures regarding 
impound inventory procedures requires its officers to open closed packages and/or containers. 
Thus the State has completely failed to meet its burden in that regard and as a result the Court has 
no choice but to suppress the marijuana evidence in this case. 
The Utah Court of Appeals at page 3 of the (Shamblin case, supra), clearly sets forth its 
reasoning for said result, as follows: 
* * * * 
We read Bertine to establish that the Fourth Amendment is 
violated if closed containers are opened during a vehicle inventory search in 
the absence of a standardized, specific procedure mandating their opening. 
Such a procedure precludes the possibility that officers conducting 
inventory searches will act arbitrarily and only selectively open containers. 
Further, such a procedure insulates police from claim that, in a particular 
case, their opening closed containers was nothing more than a 'fishing 
expedition.' It also promotes a certain equality of treatment.... 
In any event, Trooper Fox claims that he tore open (searched) the bundle he found under the 
covers in the sleeper compartment pursuant to an impound inventory and according to (Bertine. 
supra), and (Shamblin, supra), the marijuana must be suppressed for lack of evidence that he 
followed a written standardized department policy requiring that he open all such containers. 
CONCLUSION 
The Utah Highway Patrolman lacked sufficient reasonable suspicion to stop the 
Appellant's vehicle. Based upon the Trooper's alleged reason for the stop, towit: (1) to check the 
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log book and (2) defective brake light, the encounter should have concluded with the Trooper 
issuing Mr. Chevre a citation or warning for defective equipment. 
It is respectfully submitted that the Trooper should have terminated Mr. Chevre's 
detention at that point by issuing Mr. Chevre a citation or warning for defective equipment. It 
also follows that the investigation (DRE) that took place thereafter was unjustified and that the 
Defendant's arrest as a result thereof was improper. The absence of any attempt by Trooper Fox 
to articulate why any of his observations (prior to the search) provided him with any probable 
cause to believe that CNS stimulants would be found in the tractor, is the grounds for the Court 
to suppress the evidence found in the tractor. Further, Trooper Fox should have obtained a 
search warrant since the tractor trailer was not going anywhere and other officers were there to 
secure the tractor and its contents. 
The Bertine. supra, rule requires officers to follow written standardized department policy 
when doing an inventory of an impounded vehicle. No evidence was presented to show what 
those policies were. Thus the evidence seized from the sleeper compartment should be 
suppressed. 
Trooper Fox claims that he tore open (searched) one of the bundles he found under the 
covers in the sleeper compartment pursuant to an impound inventory and according to Bertine. 
/ / / 
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supra, and Shamblin. supra, and since he did not follow department standardized procedures in 
doing so, the marijuana must be suppressed. 
Respectfully submitted. 
DATED this Z3?day of December, 1998. 
7c*S*~^€*\ 
Jim R. Scarth, 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY/FAXING/MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that two full, true, correct copies of the above and foregoing 
document was hand delivered, faxed and/or ^mai led , first class mail, postage 
fully prepaid, thisx23Aaaay of December, 1998, to: Jan Graham, Attorney General, at: 236 State 
Capitol, Salt Lake City, UT 84114. 
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COLIN R. WINCHESTER [4696] 
KANE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
ERIC D. PETERSEN [7424] 
DEPUTY KANE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
76 North Main Street 
Kanab, Utah 84741 
Telephone: (435) 644-5278 
Facsimile: (435) 644-2281 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR KANE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, ] 
v. ] 
WILLIAM JOSEPH CHEVRE, ] 
Defendant. 
\ FINDINGS OF FACT AND | CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
i case No. 951600068 
| JUDGE K. L. McIFF 
This matter came before the Court on October 27, 1995, 
pursuant to Defendant's Motion To Suppress. The State of Utah 
was represented by Colin R. Winchester, Kane County Attorney. 
The Defendant was present and was represented by counsel, Jim R. 
Scarth. The parties presented evidence and argued their 
respective positions. Counsel then requested that they be 
allowed to submit written memoranda in support of their 
respective positions. On November 22, 1996, the matter came 
before the Court for additional argument and the issuance of the 
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Court's decision. The Court, having heard the testimony, having 
reviewed the parties' memoranda, and having heard the arguments 
of counsel, now therefore enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On July 18, 1995, Utah Highway Patrolman Stanley B. Fox 
pulled over a westbound tractor trailer on U.S. Highway 8 9 in 
Kanab, Utah. 
2. The tractor was being driven by the Defendant, and the 
only other occupant was an adult male in the passenger seat. 
3. Trooper Fox was accompanied by State Safety Inspector 
David Shiers. 
4. Trooper Fox decided to pull over the tractor trailer to 
check the driver's log book. 
5. As Trooper Fox was preparing to find a place to pull 
over the tractor trailer, he noticed an inoperable brake light on 
the trailer. 
6. Trooper Fox made the stop primarily to check the 
driver's log book and conduct a mechanical inspection. 
7. Once Trooper Fox made the stop, he talked to the 
Defendant, and noticed that the Defendant was "pretty" nervous, 
that his left arm seemed "kinda" unresponsive, and that the 
Defendant seemed to have a physical defect of some type. Trooper 
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Fox noticed that the Defendant's foot "was virtually bouncin' off 
the floor." 
8. Trooper Fox began to ask the Defendant questions 
relating to his log book and permits. 
9. Trooper Fox observed the Defendant's extreme nervous 
condition, his- inability to carry on a decent conversation, his 
cotton mouth or dry mouth, and his continual licking of his lips. 
10. Trooper Fox asked the Defendant to get out of the 
tractor to show him the inoperable brake light, and a leaking oil 
seal, and to review the log book and have more discussion. 
11. Once Trooper Fox had the Defendant in his patrol 
vehicle, he asked the Defendant to perform some drug recognition 
tests for the following reasons: inability to carry on a 
conversation, cotton mouth, dry lips, very nervous condition, and 
somewhat inconsistent answers regarding his whereabouts. 
12. The Defendant complied, and performed some of the drug 
recognition tests. 
13. At the time, although Trooper Fox had completed a drug 
recognition course, he did not hold a drug recognition 
evaluator's certificate because copies of the evaluations he had 
performed as part of his training had not been sent in to the 
instructors, and because he had not yet sent in a resume. 
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14. Based on his training and the drug recognition 
evaluation, Trooper Fox determined that the Defendant was under 
the influence of a central nervous system stimulant. 
15. Trooper Fox then placed the Defendant under arrest for 
driving under the influence of drugs. 
16. After placing the Defendant under arrest, Trooper Fox 
opened and looked into the trailer. 
17. The passenger did not have a commercial driver's 
license. 
18. Trooper Fox then returned to the tractor to search for 
a central nervous stimulant and to conduct an inventory search, 
because the truck was going to be impounded. 
19. Upon returning to the tractor, Trooper Fox opened the 
curtain to the sleeper area, saw something large under some 
blankets, and removed the blankets, all to ensure that no one was 
in the sleeper area. 
20. Instead of finding a person, Trooper Fox found several 
large bundles wrapped in contact paper. 
21. Trooper Fox tore open the corner of one bundle, having 
assumed the contents to be marijuana, based on training he had 
received. 
22. Ultimately, the bundles were weighed, and found to 
contain 159.04 kilograms (350.6 pounds) of marijuana. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The initial stop of the tractor trailer was legitimate 
because of the defective brake light on the trailer. Trooper 
Fox's decision to stop the tractor trailer to examine the 
driver's log book, which was made prior to the discovery of the 
defective brake light, does not adversely affect the legitimacy 
of the stop. 
2. Based on Defendant's noted physical characteristics 
while Trooper Fox was at the tractor door, i.e., Defendant's 
nervous condition, his "kinda" unresponsive arm, his bouncing 
foot, his inability to carry on a conversation, his cotton mouth 
or dry mouth, the continual licking of his lips, and his 
inconsistent answers about his whereabouts, Trooper Fox was 
justified in asking Defendant out of the tractor, and was 
justified in having Defendant perform the drug recognition tests. 
3. After Defendant was arrested for driving under the 
influence of a central nervous stimulant, it was reasonable for 
Trooper Fox to return to the tractor to perform an inventory 
search of the tractor. 
4. It was reasonable for Trooper Fox to open the curtain 
to the tractor's sleeper area, and to remove the blankets to 
ensure that no one was under them. 
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5. Based on Trooper Fox's training, it was reasonable for 
him to tear the corner of one of the bundles to examine the 
contents. 
( 2 ^ tk^-
DATED this M*tt day of November, 1997. 
BY THE COURT: 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the 30th day of May, 1997, I served a true 
and correct unsigned copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to each person or entity listed below. 
Jim R. Scarth 
P. 0. Box 160 
St. George, UT 84771 
(via hand delivery) 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the A3 day of JWuvambLf, 1997, I served a 
true and correct signed copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to each person or entity listed below: 
Jim R. Scarth 
P. 0. Box 160 
St. George, UT 84771 
(via first class mail) 
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COLIN R. WINCHESTER [4696] 
KANE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
ERIC D. PETERSEN [7424] 
DEPUTY KANE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
76 North Main Street 
Kanab, Utah 84741 
Telephone: (435) 644-5278 
Facsimile: (435) 644-2281 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR KANE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. , 
WILLIAM JOSEPH CHEVRE, ; 
Defendant. ] 
) ORDER DENYING 
) MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
) Case No. 951600068 
1 JUDGE K. L. McIFF 
This matter came before the Court on October 27, 1995, 
pursuant to Defendant's Motion to Suppress. The State of Utah 
was represented by Colin R. Winchester, Kane County Attorney. 
The Defendant was present and was represented by counsel, Jim R. 
Scarth. The parties presented evidence and argued their 
respective positions. Counsel then requested that they be 
allowed to submit written memoranda in support of their 
respective positions. On November 22, 1996, the matter came 
before the Court for additional argument and the issuance of the 
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Court's decision. The Court heard the testimony, reviewed the 
parties' memoranda, heard the arguments of counsel, and entered 
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
BASED ON THE FOREGOING, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 
DECREED that Defendant's motion to suppress the evidence is 
denied. 
DATED this 1^-—day of <N©^ etTtb^ r, 1997. 
BY THE COURT: 
K. L. Me^FF 
District Court Judge, 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the 30th day of May, 1997, I served a true 
and correct unsigned copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING MOTION 
TO SUPPRESS to each person or entity listed below: 
Jim R. Scarth (via hand delivery) 
P. 0. Box 160 
St. George, UT 84 771 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the /£2 day of^ tfe^ efrBer, 1997, I served a 
true and correct signed copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS to each person or entity listed below: 
Jim R. Scarth (via first class mail) 
P. O. Box 160 
St. George, UT 84771 
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COLIN R. WINCHESTER [4696] 
KANE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
ERIC D. PETERSEN [7424] 
DEPUTY KANE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
76 North Main Street 
Kanab, Utah 84741 
Telephone: (435) 644-5278 
Facsimile: (435) 644-2281 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR KANE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
) CONVICTION ORDER 
Plaintiff, ) 
v. ) 
) Case No. 951600068 
WILLIAM JOSEPH CHEVRE, ) 
) JUDGE K. L. McIFF 
Defendant. ) 
This matter came before the Court for a change of plea on 
May 15, 1998. The State of Utah was represented by the Kane 
County Attorney, Colin R. Winchester. The Defendant was present 
and was represented by counsel, Jim R. Scarth. The State moved 
to amend Count 1 of the Information to charge Unlawful Possession 
of a Controlled Substance, More Than One Pound of Marijuana, a 
Third Degree Felony, and that motion was granted by the Court. 
The Defendant pleaded conditionally guilty to Amended Count 1, 
reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to 
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suppress. The State moved to dismiss Counts 2, 3, 4, and 5, and 
that motion was granted by the Court. 
BASED ON THE FOREGOING, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 
DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Defendant's conditional plea of guilty is freely and 
voluntarily made, and it is ordered that the Defendant's 
conditional plea, as set forth herein, be accepted and entered. 
2. Sentencing is stayed until Defendant's appeal of the 
denial of the motion to suppress is resolved. 
3. Defendant shall remain free on bail pending further 
action in this matter. 
4. Defendant has 3 0 days from May 15, 1998, to move to 
withdraw his conditional plea of guilty, and 30 days from date 
hereof in which to file his appeal. 
DATED this \\J day of June, 1998. 
BY THE COURT: 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the 21st day of May, 1998, I served a true 
and correct unsigned copy of the foregoing CONVICTION ORDER to 
each person or entity listed below: 
Jim R. Scarth (via first class mail) 
P.O. Box 160 
St. George, Utah 84770 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the /Q{\ day of June, 1998, I served a 
true and correct signed copy of the foregoing CONVICTION ORDER to 
each person or entity listed below: 
Jim R. Scarth (via first class mail) 
P.O. Box 160 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Adult Probation and Parole (via first class mail) 
835 East 300 North #500 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
Kane County Sheriff (via hand delivery) 
76 North Main Street 
Kanab, Utah 84741 
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Art. I, CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — 
Issuance of warrant] 
The right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause sup-
ported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be 
seized. 
AMENDMENTS TO THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES 
AMENDMENT IV 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreason-
able searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
